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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bank Holding Company Act I (BHCA) defines a bank as
an institution that both accepts demand deposits and makes com-
mercial loans.2 An institution choosing to perform only one of
these two activities falls outside the scope of the BHCA and con-
stitutes a "nonbank bank."3 The creators of a nonbank bank re-
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982).
2. Id. § 1841(c). The statute defines a bank as "any institution.., which (1) accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the
business of making commercial loans." Id.
3. Although nonbank banks escape the regulations imposed by the BHCA, they are
not necessarily free from regulation. The Comptroller of the Currency ("Comptroller")
stressed this point at recent congressional hearings:
Nonbank banks suffer from a name that does not describe them accurately. Except for
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act, nonbank banks are in fact banking insti-
tutions. Unlike many other forms of limited purpose banks, OCC-chartered nonbank
banks are subject to the full scope of regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement author-
ity exercised by this Office. Nonbank banks receive regular national bank charters.
They are subject to the same laws and regulations as other national banks, including
FDIC insurance requirements if they are taking deposits; laws requiring nondiscrimina-
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ceive two principal benefits from the institution's status as a non-
bank bank.4 First, a bank holding company acquiring a nonbank
bank can avoid the geographical restrictions imposed by the Doug-
las Amendment 5 to the BHCA. Second, a company outside of the
banking industry may acquire a nonbank bank without becoming a
bank holding company and, therefore, may operate free from the
BHCA's products and geographic restraints.
The discovery of this avenue for expansion in the financial ser-
vices industry has led to an "avalanche" of applications to estab-
lish nonbank banks.7 While the Comptroller of the Currency
("Comptroller") has been willing to grant charters to nonbank
banks,' the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
("Board") has been very reluctant to approve these institutions9
and has opposed the widespread establishment of nonbank banks.
The Board's resistance has resulted in litigation leaving the future
of nonbank banks in doubt and has prompted forecasts of the de-
mise of nonbank banks.10
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions, however, have
tory lending and other consumer laws; and safety and soundness regulations, including
capital requirements. Nonbank banks also receive regular on-site examinations and
must get regulatory approval for changes in their corporate structure.
Nonbank Banks: Hearings on H.R. 20 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Ur-
ban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 179 (1985) (statement of C. T. Conover, Comptroller of the
Currency) [hereinafter Hearings].
4. See generally Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus.
LAw. 99, 100 (1985) (discussing the consequences of creating a nonbank bank).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 39-47.
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1982).
7. As of June 28, 1985, the Comptroller had received 368 applications to charter inter-
state nonbank banks. U.S. Trust Petitibn for Certiorari at A35, U.S. Trust Corp. v. Board of
Governors, 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 106 S.Ct.
875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986).
8. As of June 5, 1985, the Comptroller had granted preliminary approval for 279 non-
bank bank charter applications. Nonbank Bank Sweepstakes-OCC Version, BANKING
EXPANSION REP., Feb. 3, 1986, at 8, 9.
9. The Board has authorized only 23 nonbank banks. See, e.g., Mellon National Corp.,
71 Fed. Res. Bull. 256 (1985); Maryland National Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 253 (1985);
Chase Manhattan Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 249 (1985); Irving Bank Corp., 71 Fed. Res.
Bull. 173 (1985); First National State Bancorp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 115 (1985); Suburban
Bancorp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 61 (1985); Bank of Boston Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 55 (1985);
Bankers Trust Corp., 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 51 (1985); First Interstate Bancorp., 70 Fed. Res.
Bull. 660 (1984). In addition, the Board has approved no applications since March 15, 1985.
See Suspension of Processing of Applications to Acquire Nonbank Banks, 71 Fed. Res.
Bull. 323 (1985).
10. See The Nonbank Bank May Be History, BANKING EXPANSION REP., June 3, 1985,
at 2, 3.
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revitalized the nonbank bank controversy and have legitimized the
existence of nonbank banks. In Board of Governors v. Dimension
Financial Corporation11 the Supreme Court held that the Board
exceeded its authority when it expanded the definition of demand
deposits and commercial loans in order to include some nonbank
banks under the Board's regulatory umbrella.12 The Court viewed
the question of whether to regulate nonbank banks as a matter for
Congress to address, not the Board or the courts.1 s Subsequently,
the Court remanded U.S. Trust Corporation v. Board of Gover-
nors14 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit for action consistent with Dimension Financial. In U.S. Trust
Corporation the Eleventh Circuit had interpreted the Douglas
Amendment as prohibiting the establishment of an interstate net-
work of depository nonbank banks.15 However, because the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the BHCA in Dimension Financial
directly conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit's original holding, the
Eleventh Circuit was forced to reverse its earlier decision and af-
firm the Board's approval of U.S. Trust's application for a non-
bank bank. Thus, the Supreme Court's actions leave little room for
the Board or the courts to prevent the proliferation of nonbank
banks. The nonbank bank issue is now squarely in the hands of
Congress, but so far Congress has been reluctant to address the
controversy.
This Note examines the status of nonbank banks in light of
these recent Supreme Court decisions and discusses concerns that
Congress should address through legislation. Part II examines the
legislative history behind both the BHCA's definition of a bank
and the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA. Part III discusses reg-
ulatory and judicial responses to the creation of nonbank banks
and analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court's Dimension Finan-
cial decision. Finally, Part IV looks at nonbank banks' influence on
the financial services industry, examines proposed congressional
solutions, and suggests the need for comprehensive banking reform
legislation rather than piecemeal legislative action.
11. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
12. Id. at 689.
13. Id.
14. 106 S.Ct. 875 (1986).
15. Florida Dep't of Banking v. Board of Governors, 760 F.2d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom. U.S. Tr st Corp. v. Board of Gover-
nors, 106 S. Ct. 875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986).
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II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. The Changing Definition of a "Bank"
Congress enacted the BHCA in response to the increasing
number of bank holding companies and the perceived need for
comprehensive federal regulation of these institutions to protect
the public."6 The changing definition of a BHCA "bank" has
prompted the current nonbank bank controversy. Three different
definitions of "bank" have evolved since the BHCA's inception in
1956-the original version and the 1966 and 1970 amended ver-
sions. With each amendment, Congress debated and narrowed the
scope of the BHCA's application to certain financial institutions.
Despite these changes, the overall policy behind the BHCA has re-
mained the same.17 The BHCA seeks to avoid an undue concentra-
tion of banking resources and to maintain a separation between
banking and commerce.18 Underlying both objectives is the policy
of preventing a monopoly over commercial credit.19
The original 1956 definition of a bank was broad, encompass-
ing all state and federally chartered banks.20 The 1966 amendment
16. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2482, 2483.
17. In 1956 the Board chairman noted the two principal problems arising from the
bank holding company structure:
(1) The unrestricted ability of a bank holding company group to add to the num-
ber of its banking units, making possible the concentration of commercial bank facili-
ties in a particular area under a single control and management; and
(2) The combination under single control of both banking and nonbanking enter-
prises, permitting departure from the principle that banking institutions should not
engage in business wholly unrelated to banking ....
S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS,
2482, 2483. The 1970 Senate Report stated that "it is desirable to continue our long-stand-
ing policy of separating banking from commerce". S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d. Seas.,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5520, 5522. The report noted that the
concern over the concentration of banking resources was also a primary reason for the 1970
amendment, stating that because of "the large growth of the assets held by the one-bank
holding company industry ... it is necessary to amend the Bank Holding Company Act to
bring one-bank holding companies under the regulation provided by that act." Id.
18. See supra note 17.
19. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 46 (1980). The Senate
Report in 1966 noted this concern over commercial credit, stating that "[tlhe purpose of the
[BHCA] was to restrain undue concentration of control of commercial bank credit, and to
prevent abuse by a holding company of its control over this type of credit for the benefit of
its nonbanking subsidiaries." S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2385, 2391.
20. The 1956 definition of a bank was "any national banking association or any State
bank, savings bank, or trust company." Act of May 9, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(c), 70
Stat. 133 (1956).
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narrowed the definition of a bank to "any institution that accepts
deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on de-
mand. ' 21 Congress' objective in narrowing the definition was to
limit the scope of the BHCA to commercial banks." Congress spe-
cifically sought to exclude savings banks and industrial banks from
the BHCA's authority.2 Congress chose to exempt these institu-
tions by using the demand-deposit test because savings and indus-
trial banks commonly did not accept demand deposits.2 4 Critics
saw this definition as overly broad, encompassing institutions that
were not commercial banks. They deemed a commercial loan test
as more appropriate.25
Congress added the commercial loan test with the 1970
amendments, 6 which required that a BHCA bank "engage[] in the
21. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 3, 80 Stat. 236 (1966).
22. Senator Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, spoke in favor of
the bill, stating that the bill "was intended to apply to commercial banks of a sort which
might have relationships with businesses and business firms which should be avoided." 112
CONG. REC. 12,385 (1966).
23. The 1966 Senate Report stated:
This objective can be achieved without applying the act to savings banks, and there are
at least a few instances in which the reference to "savings bank" in the present defini-
tion may result in covering companies that control two or more industrial banks. To
avoid this result, the bill redefines "bank" as an institution that accepts deposits paya-
ble on demand (checking accounts), the commonly accepted test of whether an institu-
tion is a commercial bank so as to exclude institutions like industrial banks and nonde-
posit trust companies.
S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2385, 2391; see also 102 CONG. REc. 6957 (1956) (statement of Sen. Robertson).
24. See id.
25. A Boston holding company president wrote:
We believe that the proposed amendment to Section 2(c) needs modification to accom-
plish its objective of limiting the application of the act to commercial banks. The
amendment fails because it emphasizes the source of funds rather than the use to
which the funds are put. We suggest that the use of funds is the relevant factor since if
a bank does not engage in commercial lending, it cannot commit any of the hypotheti-
cal abuses which bank holding company legislation is designed to prevent.
Letter from William W. Wolbach, President, The Boston Co., Inc., to Sen. A. Willis Robert-
son, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency (April 28, 1966), reprinted in
Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956: Hearings Before a Subcomm. on Banking
and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 732-33 (1966).
The Federal Reserve Board also supported the addition of a commercial loan test to the
definition. The Chairman of the Board stated that he was "impressed by the argument that
a bank that does not make commercial loans is not apt to be involved in the kind of abuses
the Act is designed to prevent." Letter from Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to Sen. Robertson (May 11, 1966), reprinted in 112 CONG. REc.
12,386 (1966).
26. The 1970 amendments to the BHCA came in response to the growth of one-bank
holding companies (both in number and size). Prior to these amendments, the Act's regula-
tions exempted one-bank holding companies. See S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
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business of making commercial loans. '27 The amendments resulted
in the present conjunctive definition, making the BHCA applicable
only to institutions that both accept demand deposits and make
commercial loans. The Board supported the commercial loan test
in 196628 and again in 1970. The Senate Report cited the Board's
support as a contributing factor to the 1970 change, noting that
the Board had argued that the 1966 definition was too broad be-
cause it could include institutions that do not make commercial
loans and, therefore, do not constitute commercial banks.2' The
House Conference Report also accepted the need for the new defi-
nition, stating that the commercial loan test was a specific congres-
sional "exemption from coverage of the Act for any company which
is chartered as a bank but which does not make commercial
loans."30
Despite the Senate and House Reports' language noting the
exemption's general applicability to "institutions" and "any com-
pany," critics argue that the 1970 amendments were designed to
benefit only one company-Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Com-
pany ("Boston Safe").3 1 The Board accepted this argument in 1982
despite its earlier support of the commercial loan test.32 Propo-
nents of this view rely on statements made during the debate on
the amendment indicating that Boston Safe was virtually the only
bank at the time that did not make commercial loans.33 This con-
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5519, 5520-22.
27. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(c), 84 Stat. 1760, 1762 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1841(d)).
28. See supra note 25.
29. S. RaP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5519, 5541.
30. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5561, 5573.
31. See Florida Dep't of Banking v. Board of Governors, 760 F.2d 1135, 1140 n.10
(11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom. U.S. Trust Co. v. Board of
Governors, 106 S.Ct. 875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986). Boston Safe's parent company had
supported the commercial loan definition in 1966 along with the Board. See supra note 25.
32. Felsenfeld, supra note 4, at 110 (quoting letter from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to William M. Issae (Dec. 10, 1982) concerning Dreyfeus Corpora-
tion's proposed acquisition of Lincoln State Bank). The Board also had advised Congress at
the time of the amendment that it "would have very limited application at present, possibly
affecting only one institution." One-Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970-Hearings
on S. 1052, et al., before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
136-37 (1970) (letter from Governor Robertson of the Board) [hereinafter One-Bank Hold-
ing Company].
33. Representative Gonzalez, a member of the House Banking and Currency Commit-
tee, stated that "[t]he effect of the amendment is to exempt the Boston Co. from the bill"
because it is "[v]irtually the only bank which does no commercial lending." 116 CoG. REC.
1740 [Vol. 39:1735
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tention also is supported by the House Conferees' instruction to
the Board to construe the exemption very narrowly and to con-
tinue to bring within the Act all bank holding companies that
should be covered because the new exemption was intended for
only "a very small number of cases. 34
Although the 1970 amendments limited the BHCA's coverage
of banks that did not make commercial loans, the amendments ex-
panded the Board's authority to permit a greater number of non-
banking activities for bank holding companies.3 5 Permitted non-
banking activities include those that the Board deems "so closely
related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto. ' 3  These activities are exempt from
BHCA regulations promoting the separation of banking and com-
merce. Congress intended this provision to provide bank holding
companies with the flexibility to engage in innovative nonbanking
activities in reaction to unforeseen changes in the financial services
industry.37 Congress believed this flexibility was necessary to en-
sure that bank holding companies will continue to provide the
public with essential financial services in the future.3 ' Pursuant to
this exemption, bank holding companies are able to acquire non-
bank banks as an activity closely related to banking.
25,848 (1970) (quoting from the National Journal of July 18, 1970).
34. H. R. CONF. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5561, 5573-74.
35. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 103(4), 84 Stat. 1760, 1763 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)).
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982) [hereinafter § 4(c)(8)].
37. The Senate Report agreed with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
("FDIC") statement concerning the reasoning behind these BHCA § 4(c)(8) exemptions:
Inasmuch as the economy and its financial requirements are constantly changing, the
Corporation considers it essential that banks and bank holding companies have the
flexibility to engage in new types of bank-related activities that may be needed now
and in the future if the financial needs of the people are to be met efficiently, competi-
tively, and at reasonable cost. Likely changes in technology, the nature of financial
competition and the economic and legal functions of commercial banking all lead to a
conclusion that retaining such flexibility is the wise course for the future.
S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
5519, 5531 (quoting One-Bank Holding Company, supra note 32). See also 116 CONG. REc.
31,823 (1970) (statement of Sen. Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency).
38. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5519, 5531 (quoting One-Bank Holding Company, supra note 32).
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B. The Douglas Amendment
The Douglas Amendment to the BHCA contains the geo-
graphic restrictions that bank holding companies can avoid by cre-
ating a nonbank bank. The Douglas Amendment prohibits the
Board from approving an acquisition of a bank in one state by a
bank holding company in another state unless the laws of the state
in which the acquired bank is located specifically authorize the ac-
quisition.3 9 Senator Douglas, the chief sponsor of the Amend-
ment,40 explained that the Amendment sought "to prevent an un-
due concentration of banking and financial power, and instead
keep the private control of credit diffused as much as possible. '4 1
He was concerned that a concentration of credit resources also
would lead to a concentration of industry and trade.42 Senator
Douglas cited examples from Britain and Germany where a mo-
nopoly over credit resources created unfair competitive advantages
for a bank's nonbanking affiliates because of their freer access to
commercial credit.43
Senator Douglas also expressed concern over the rapid expan-
sion of bank holding companies and their control of more than
twenty percent of the bank deposits in nine states.44 The Amend-
ment attempted to prevent the continued acquisition of banks
across state lines without the state's permission. At the time of its
adoption the Amendment amounted to a complete prohibition on
interstate banking because no state explicitly permitted out-of-
state banks or their holding companies to enter the state for the
purpose of conducting banking operations.4' The Amendment,
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982).
40. The Douglas Amendment was added to the BHCA on the floor of the Senate after
the Amendment had already been reported out of the House and Senate banking commit-
tees. Because the Amendment's legislative history is limited to the Senate debate, "the com-
ments of individual legislators carry substantial weight, especially when they reflect a con-
sensus as to the meaning and objectives of the proposed legislation though not necessarily
the wisdom of that legislation." Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 105 S.Ct.
2545, 2551 (1985).
41. 102 CONG. REC. 6857 (1956). Senator Douglas also stated that this purpose
extended to the entire BHCA. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
42. 102 CONG. REC. 6857 (1956).
43. Id. But see infra note 195.
44. 102 CONG. REC. at 6858-60.
45. Id. at 6860. Today many states have passed legislation permitting out-of-state
bank holding companies to enter their states. Some limit this invitation to companies domi-
ciled in states in their geographic region with reciprocal statutes. Maine was the first state
to pass regional interstate banking legislation. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 1013 (1980
& Supp. 1985).
1742 [Vol. 39:1735
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however, permitted individual states to decide whether to allow in-
terstate acquisitions as the financial services industry developed in
the future.4 Despite the geographic restrictions, none of Senator
Douglas' statements supports the idea that the Amendment pro-
hibits the ownership of institutions engaging in what the BHCA
itself defines as nonbanking activities. 47 The Douglas Amendment's
reach, therefore, is limited by the BHCA's definition of a "bank."
III. REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The history of regulatory and judicial responses to the estab-
lishment of nonbank banks is marked by the Board's opposition,
the Comptroller's permission, the circuit courts' confusion, the Su-
preme Court's allowance, and Congress' inaction. The Board, al-
though backing the 1970 change in the definition of "bank," has
opposed the expanded use of nonbank banks at every opportu-
nity-in drafting regulations and orders, in litigating its denial of
nonbank bank applications and the issues arising from its expan-
sive definitions of "bank," and in lobbying for a change in the defi-
nition of "bank" under the BHCA.48 While supporting the non-
bank bank concept, on two occasions the Comptroller voluntarily
has imposed moratoriums on the processing of nonbank bank char-
ters49 and an injunction currently prevents the Comptroller from
granting final approval of additional charters. ° Congress has been
very slow to consider any nonbank banking legislation, with the
full House never considering the matter and with a Senate-passed
bill dying of House inaction in 1984.51 In 1985 the House Banking
Committee approved a bill for consideration by the full House, but
the Senate Banking Committee took no such similar action.52
Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit interpreted the BHCA as permitting nonbank bank prolifera-
46. 102 CONG. REc. 6857 (1956).
47. The Supreme Court has noted that the Douglas Amendment places no limitation
on bank holding companies' ownership of nonbanking entities. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Manag-
ers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 47-48 & n.13 (1980). But see Florida Dep't of Banking v. Board of
Governors, 760 F.2d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Douglas Amendment pro-
hibits the establishment of nonbank banks unless expressly permitted by state law), cert.
granted, vacated, and remanded sub. nom. U.S. Trust Co. v. Board of Governors, 106 S.Ct.
875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986).
48. See infra notes 70-92 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
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tion; the Eleventh Circuit, however, interpreted the same Act as
prohibiting depository nonbank banks.53 The latest chapter in the
nonbank bank odyssey occurred when the Supreme Court cleared a
major hurdle from the path obstructing the establishment and de-
velopment of nonbank banks by upholding the Tenth Circuit's in-
terpretation of the BHCA and by vacating and remanding the
Eleventh Circuit decision .5 This part of the Note explores regula-
tory and judicial responses to the nonbank bank controversy and
examines the status of nonbank banks in light of the Supreme
Court's recent Dimension Financial decision.
A. The Comptroller of the Currency
The Comptroller approved the first nonbank bank when Gulf
& Western Industries applied to acquire a California bank and
proposed to cease the bank's commercial loan activity.55 As the
growth of nonbank banks accelerated and the nonbank bank de-
bate intensified, the Comptroller used his power as the grantor of
national banking charters to delay significantly the nonbank bank
proliferation. Unlike the Board, the Comptroller favored establish-
ing these institutions and delayed granting charters only to allow
Congress time to act on the matter. In recent congressional hear-
ings the Comptroller stated that nonbank banks have a "clearly
positive" impact on interstate banking56 and that interindustry
ownership of nonbank banks benefits both consumers and the fi-
nancial services industry.57 Despite these optimistic views on non-
bank banks, the Comptroller twice has imposed moratoriums on
the granting of charters to nonbank banks and presently is pre-
vented from granting final approval of additional nonbank bank
charters by an injunction issued by the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida. 8
On April 6, 1983, the Comptroller imposed his first morato-
rium to allow Congress to consider fully the impact of nonbank
banks.5 9 The Comptroller originally set the moratorium to expire
53. See infra notes 98-132 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 133-57 and accompanying text.
55. See Felsenfeld, supra note 4, at 111.
56. Hearings, supra note 3, at 174 (statement of C. T. Conover, Comptroller of the
Currency).
57. Id.
58. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Conover, No. 84-1403 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15,
1985) (preliminary injunction).
59. Policy Statement Regarding Non-Bank Bank Approvals, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,993
(1983).
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at the end of 1983, but extended the moratotium until March 31,
1984, at the request of the Chairman of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee. At the moratorium's expiration nonbank bank charter ap-
plications flooded the Comptroller's office."0 On May 18, 1984, the
Comptroller announced that any applications filed after March 31,
1984, would not be considered until the end of the 1984 legislative
session.6 1 Congress, however, adjourned without any new legisla-
tion on the matter; subsequently, on October 30, 1984, the Comp-
troller approved 29 of the 315 new applications and announced his
intention to act on the remaining applications.2 Asserting that the
BHCA clearly permitted nonbank banks, the Comptroller noted
that twice he had imposed moratoria to allow Congress to consider
the issue, but Congress had not acted. As a result, the Comptroller
"felt compelled" to begin considering the outstanding
applications.6
Despite the Comptroller's intention to begin the wholesale
chartering of these institutions, a Florida district court's injunction
issued on February 15, 1985, prevented the Comptroller from
granting final approval to nonbank bank charters.6 4 The injunc-
tion's basis is the belief that the Comptroller does not have the
power under the National Bank Act to charter nonbank banks.6 5
The Comptroller has not actively challenged the district court's
position even though the Comptroller already has granted prelimi-
nary approval to 279 charter applications.6 6 Bolstered by the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Dimension Financial,7 the Comptroller
now likely will challenge the Florida court's position.68
60. The Comptroller received over 200 charter applications for nonbank banks
between March 31, 1984, and May 18, 1984. Renewal of Policy Statement Regarding Non-
Bank Bank Approvals, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,137 (1984).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Conover, No. 84-1403 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15,
1985) (preliminary injunction).
65. See Holland, Supreme Court Rescues Nonbank Banks, BANKING EXPANSION REP.,
Feb. 3, 1986, at 1, 7.
66. See id.
67. Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986); see infra notes
133-57 and accompanying text.
68. See Wermeil & Langley, Limited Service Banks Cleared By Supreme Court in 8-0
Decision, Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1986, at 3, col. 4 (statement by general counsel to the
Comptroller).
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B. The Federal Reserve Board
While the Comptroller possesses the power to grant national
bank charters, the Board must grant permission, under section
4(c)(8) of the BHCA, 9 for any bank holding company's acquisition
of a nonbank bank, regardless of whether the nonbank bank will
operate under a national or state charter. The Board consistently
has opposed the widespread establishment of nonbank banks and
has lobbied heavily for a change in the definition of "bank".70 The
Board's opposition stems from the belief that nonbank banks are
created to avoid the interstate banking prohibitions 71 and tend to
erode the separation of banking and commerce. 2 A more subtle
reason for the Board's opposition is the effect of nonbank banks on
the Board's ability to institute monetary policy. Circumventing the
Board's regulations allegedly contributes to the instability of the
money supply and an inability to meet money supply targets. 3
The Board's direct opposition to nonbank banks is illustrated by
its unfavorable rulings on nonbank bank applications and its use of
Regulation y.74 In both orders and regulations, the Board has at-
tempted to expand the definition of "demand deposit" and "com-
mercial loan," leading invariably to court challenges.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
70. See, e.g., Naylor, Volcker Urges Congress to Give Top Priority to Nonbank Bank,
Am. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1986, at 1.
71. Hearings, supra note 3, at 14 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman of Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
72. Id. at 23.
73. Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, alluded to this factor when
he stated that commercial banks "are the critical link between monetary policy and the
economy." Id. at 19. The nonbank banks' effect on monetary policy was noted later in the
hearings with the comment that it "must complicate the Federal Reserve's task in managing
our nation's monetary policy and money supply goals." Id. at 126-27 (statement of William
Nodine on behalf of the U.S. League of Savings Institutions).
One commentator has noted:
[S]ome economists have concluded that [financial] innovation has in fact reduced the
predictability of the money-GNP relationship to such an extent that targeting money
supply growth is no longer appropriate, at least as long as significant innovation and
deregulation are occurring.
Others, however, favor retention of the present strategy at least for the present.
They point out that the instability that has been observed in recent years has resulted
from (1) concerted efforts . . . to circumvent regulations . . . and (2) the disruptions
caused by subsequent deregulation.
Broaddus, Financial Innovation in the United States-Background, Current Status and
Prospects, EcoN. REv., Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Jan./Feb. 1985, at 2, 20.
74. Regulation Y is the Board's regulation implementing the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, as amended, and the Change in Bank Control Act of 1978. 12 C.F.R. § 225
(1986).
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The Board first attempted to slow the growth of nonbank
banks when it denied nonbank bank status to a subsidiary of Wil-
shire Oil Company.75 The subsidiary attempted to convert to a
nonbank bank by eliminating demand deposits. It reserved the
right to demand fourteen days notice prior to allowing withdrawals
from a customer's checking account. Although the subsidiary in-
formed its customers of this change in bank policy, the subsidiary
also assured customers that it never intended to enforce this right.
The Board declared that such action did not transform the account
from its classification as a demand deposit.7 6 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
Board's order, finding that denial of the charter fell fully within
the Board's authority under the BHCA.77
A more significant action took place when the Board
attempted to redefine demand deposits and commercial loans. The
Board expanded "demand deposits" by including in its definition
negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts.7 8 The Board be-
lieved that NOW accounts, in practice, were equivalent to demand
deposits because the provisions requiring notice prior to with-
drawal were rarely, if ever, invoked.79 The Board relied on its order
in Wilshire and the subsequent Third Circuit decision affirming
that order to support emphasizing the substance of the deposit
rather than its form.80 An additional factor the Board believed
demonstrated the actual character of NOW accounts was the
"transaction accounts" label that Congress attached to NOW ac-
counts in other legislation.81
The Board fully redefined demand deposits and commercial
loans when adopting new definitions in Regulation Y.12 The Board
justified these revisions as "bring[ing] the regulation into conform-
ity with previous orders of the Board interpreting the Act and...
carry[ing] out the purposes and prevent[ing] evasion[s] of the
75. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors, 668 F.2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982).
76. Id.
77. Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion, see infra text accompanying
notes 92-96.
78. First Bancorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 253 (1982).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 253-54.
81. Id. at 254.
82. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Revision of Regula-
tion Y, 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 818 (1984).
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Act."13 The Board believed nonbank banks threatened the national
banking system because they damaged Congress' efforts to main-
tain a separation between banking and commerce, undermined
prohibitions on interstate banking, and provided a competitive
advantage for nonbank banks over regulated banks offering
equivalent services. 4 The Board expanded "demand deposits" to
include NOW accounts and other instruments that "as a matter of
practice" were payable on demand." The Board expanded "com-
mercial loans" to include money market and interbank
transactions.8 "
Even with the expanded definitions, nonbank banks could
have continued to develop if bank holding companies avoided the
prohibited activities in Regulation Y. U.S. Trust demonstrated
that the avenue for expansion was still open when it converted a
Florida subsidiary into a nonbank bank. U.S Trust applied for ap-
proval under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA to expand the subsidi-
ary's activities to include accepting time and demand deposits as
well as making consumer loans, but specifically avoided making
commercial loans even under the revised definitions.8 7 Although
the Board believed approval of the application undermined the
policies of the BHCA, the Board found itself bound by the defini-
tion of a bank to approve the application.8 The Board's order con-
tained an urgent plea for congressional action to protect the poli-
cies of the BHCA 9 The Board also included several conditions in
its order to ensure that U.S. Trust would not engage in commercial
83. Id. at 798-99.
84. Id. at 835-36.
85. Deposits that a depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand were defined as
"any deposit with transactional capability that, as a matter of practice, is payable on
demand and that is withdrawable by check, draft, negotiable order of withdrawal, or other
similar instrument." Id. at 818.
86. Commercial loans were defined as "any loan other than a loan to an individual for
personal, family, household, or charitable purposes, and includes the purchase of retail
installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, and
similar money market instruments, the extension of broker call loans, the sale of federal
funds, and the deposit of interest-bearing funds." Id.
87. U.S. Trust Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 371 (1984).
88. Id. at 372.
89. The Board stated:
The requirement of Board approval of this application under the provisions of existing
law is one of a number of recent developments that underscore the critical need for
Congressional action on legislation to apply the policies of the Bank Holding Company
Act to institutions that are chartered as banks and that offer transaction accounts to
the public.
Id. at 373.
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lending either directly or indirectly.90 Applying the statutory tests,
the Board concluded that the subsidiary would be engaging in
proper nonbanking activities and that these activities would not
"result in any conflicts of interest, unsound banking practices, or
other adverse effects.""1 Thus, even with Regulation Y's expanded
definitions and the Board's best efforts, the Board could not bring
nonbank banks to an end. The Board, however, announced subse-
quently that it was suspending further processing of applications
to acquire nonbank banks in recognition of the injunction imposed
on the Comptroller.9 2
C. Federal Circuit Court Decisions
Each of the Board's actions discussed above was appealed and
the resulting decisions eventually created a split among the circuit
courts over the correct interpretation of the BHCA. The first case
to address directly the growing nonbank bank trend came before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Wil-
shire Oil Company v. Board of Governors9" the Third Circuit up-
held the Board's finding that Wilshire's mythical fourteen-day
notice requirement prior to withdrawal did not alter the checking
account's character as demand deposits.9 4 The court, therefore,
held that the Board operated within its power to prevent evasions
of the BHCA's purpose 95 by issuing a cease and desist order.96 The
court endorsed the Board's action of looking beyond the form of
the deposit to the substance of the account.9 7
A more substantive challenge to the legality of nonbank banks
occurred when the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
90. The Board imposed three conditions:
(1) Applicant will not operate Trust Company's demand deposit taking activities in
tandem with any other subsidiary or other financial institutions;
(2) Applicant will not link in any way the demand deposit and commercial lending
services that define a bank under the Act; and
(3) Trust Company will not engage in any transaction with affiliates . . . without the
Board's approval.
Id.
91. Id.
92. See Suspension of Processing of Applications to Acquire Nonbank Banks, 71 Fed.
Res. Bull. 323 (1985).
93. 668 F.2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982).
94. 668 F.2d at 739. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
95. Section 5(b) of the BHCA authorizes the Board "to issue such regulations and
orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of this
chapter and prevent evasions thereof." 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b) (1982).
96. 668 F.2d at 738-39.
97. Id.
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Circuit addressed the issue in First Bancorporation v. Board of
Governors.8 First Bancorporation applied to the Board to acquire
a subsidiary and operate it as an industrial loan company. First
Bancorporation planned to offer NOW accounts and make com-
mercial loans through the subsidiary. The Board, however, deter-
mined that NOW accounts were demand deposits in substance.""
Accordingly, the Board approved the acquisition of the subsidiary
only on the condition that the subsidiary choose between offering
NOW accounts and making commercial loans. 100
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned the Board's order.101
The court noted that Utah regulations required industrial loan
companies to reserve the right to require thirty days notice prior to
permitting withdrawals from NOW accounts. 02 The court distin-
guished Wilshire because Wilshire concerned a blatant attempt to
evade the BHCA with a mythical notice requirement.103 In First
Bancorporation no "legal right to withdrawal on demand" existed
because the thirty day notice was a legal requirement, not a
sham.10 4 The Board argued that the court should not interpret lit-
erally the statutory language of the BHCA, but examine the legis-
lative intent behind the definition. The court, however, found the
legislative intent unequivocally expressed in the words of the stat-
ute and found that NOW accounts, as restricted by the Utah regu-
lation, did not constitute demand deposits under the BHCA. 0 5
The Board's attempt to redefine demand deposits and com-
mercial loans did not end with First Bancorporation. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit again faced the non-
bank bank issue in Dimension Financial Corporation v. Board of
Governors. °6 Dimension Financial Corporation 07 challenged the
98. 728 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1984).
99. First Bancorp., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 253 (1982); see supra notes 76-80 and accompa-
nying text.
100. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 254. The Board also informed First Bancorporation that it
would have to make the same decision with another industrial loan company subsidiary that
was presently performing both functions. 728 F.2d at 435. If the subsidiary chose to offer
NOW accounts, it would "be subject to the same interest rate limitations and reserve
requirements that would apply to a federally insured depository institution." Id. at 255.
101. 728 F.2d at 438.
102. Id. at 435; see UTAH DEPT. OF FIN. INsT. REG. No. 2, Vol. 1 at 162.
103. 728 F.2d at 436. The NOW accounts in First Bancorporation differed from de-
mand deposits in substance as well as form.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 436-37.
106. 744 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir. 1984), afl'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
107. Dimension sought approval to open 31 nonbank banks in 25 states. Wermeil &
Langley, supra note 68, at 3, col. 2.
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Board's revision of Regulation Y,10 which broadened the definition
of "bank" and curbed the number of nonbank banks. Adhering to
its demand deposit holding in First Bancorporation,°9 the court
confined its discussion in Dimension Financial to Regulation Y's
expanded definition of commercial loans. The Tenth Circuit found
that the Board's inclusion of money market and interbank transac-
tions in its definition of commercial loan had no relation to the
actual meaning of commercial loan but "was adopted purely to
carry out a new Board policy-to stop changes in the business of
providing financial services."'' 10 The court traced prior Board rul-
ings that had held money market activities were not commercial
loans"" and, after examining the BHCA's legislative history, stated
that Congress expressly permitted the creation of nonbank
banks."" Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit overturned the Board's
order, finding that the Board lacked statutory authority under sec-
tion 5(b)11 3 of the BHCA to redefine the elements of a "bank" for
the purpose of bringing certain nonbank banks under the Act's
scope.' 4
The opposite view was expressed in the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Florida Department of Banking v. Board of Gover-
nors." 5 The case arose out of a challenge to the Board's approval
of U.S. Trust Company's application to expand the activities of its
nonbanking Florida subsidiary."l6 The Eleventh Circuit took an
approach different from the Tenth Circuit in interpreting the
BHCA's definition of "bank." The Eleventh Circuit refused to
interpret literally the statute and instead examined the BHCA's
underlying policy. The court found that Congress designed the Act
to prevent an undue concentration of banking resources and to
prevent abusive credit practices between a bank holding company
108. See Revision of Regulation Y, 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 121 (1984); supra notes 82-86
and accompanying text.
109. 744 F.2d at 1404.
110. Id. at 1405 (emphasis in original).
111. Id. at 1404-06. "The change was from white to black, from no to yes." Id. at 1406.
112. Id. at 1407.
113. See supra note 95.
114. See 744 F.2d at 1410-11.
115. 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom.
U.S. Trust v. Board of Governors, 106 S. Ct. 875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986).
116. See U.S. Trust Corp., 70 Fed. Res. Bull. 371 (1984); see also supra notes 86-90
and accompanying text. The Florida Bankers Association, the Florida Department of Bank-
ing and Finance, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and the Sun Bank/Palm Beach
all had appealed the Board's order. 760 F.2d at 1138.
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and its subsidiaries. 117 In the court's view, the Douglas Amend-
ment also embodied a third policy of prohibiting "interstate de-
posit-taking networks by bank holding companies without specific
state authorization." 118 The court then interpreted the 1970 addi-
tion of the commercial loan test as a "technical amendment," in-
tended to benefit a single institution"9 and not to destroy the
Douglas Amendment's policy.120 The court concluded that a literal
interpretation of the BHCA would deny Florida the right to pro-
hibit out-of-state bank holding companies from establishing de-
posit-taking institutions in Florida.' The Eleventh Circuit over-
turned the Board's order granting approval to U.S. Trust's
application and held that the Board should have exercised its
power under section 5(b) to deny the application.' 22
Following the Eleventh Circuit's Florida Department of
Banking decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reiterated its BHCA interpretation in Oklahoma
Bankers Association v. Federal Reserve Board.'23 Citicorp had
applied to the Board under section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA for per-
mission to purchase an inactive Oklahoma trust company's char-
ter.124 Citicorp planned to operate a subsidiary that would engage
in commercial lending and issue thrift certificates, but would not
accept demand deposits or offer NOW accounts. The Oklahoma
Bankers Association contended that the subsidiary was a bank be-
cause, under Oklahoma law, a trust company had the authority to
accept demand deposits and make commercial loans. Therefore,
the Association argued, the Douglas Amendment prohibited Cit-
icorp's acquisition regardless of whether the trust company
planned to exercise this power.12' The Board rejected this conten-
tion and approved the acquisition, noting that because Citicorp did
not plan to accept demand deposits through its subsidiary, the ac-
quisition did not present the same "concerns previously expressed
117. 760 F.2d at 1141; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
118. 760 F.2d at 1141.
119. Id. at 1142; see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
120. 760 F.2d at 1142.
121. Id. at 1143.
122. Id. at 1143-44; see supra note 95.
123. 766 F.2d 1446 (10th Cir. 1985).
124. See Citicorp, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 921 (1983). Oklahoma law did not permit the
chartering of industrial banks. Citicorp, however, planned to engage in activities similar to
an industrial bank through its trust company. Id.
125. Id.
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by the Board regarding the permissibility of nonbank banks. 1 26
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the Board's order.12 The
Tenth Circuit followed its previous decisions and, without men-
tioning the Florida Department of Banking decision, contradicted
the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning. The court rejected the Associa-
tion's arguments that (1) the thrift deposit accounts were demand
deposits and (2) the trust company was a bank because the com-
pany would have the power to accept demand deposits. 128 The
court found that the thrift deposit accounts were not demand de-
posits because the accounts were governed by legally enforceable
contracts establishing a right to notice prior to withdrawal. 129 In
rejecting the second argument, the court commented that Congress
intentionally had abandoned the argument that an institution
should be classified as a bank merely because the institution had
the power, under state law, to accept demand deposits. 30 The
court found that the proper analysis in determining whether an
institution is a bank is whether the institution actually performs
the services that constitute the two-part statutory test.'3 ' In up-
holding the Board's order, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that the
BHCA's definition of a "bank" clearly allowed the creation of non-
bank banks. 132
D. Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corporation
The Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to settle the
confusion surrounding the legal status of nonbank banks by grant-
ing certiorari to Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Cor-
poration,13 3 but declined the opportunity to hear U.S. Trust Cor-
poration v. Board of Governors34 in tandem. In Dimension
126. Id. at 922. The Board also found no evidence that this acquisition "would result
in any undue concentration of resources, conflicts of interest, unsound banking practices, or
other adverse effects." Id.
127. 766 F.2d at 1452.
128. Id. at 1449-50.
129. Id. The court also rejected the notion that the actual practice should be taken
into account rather than the statute. Id. at 1450, citing First Bancorp., 728 F.2d at 436.
130. 766 F.2d at 1450.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1449 (citing Dimension Financial Corp., 744 F.2d at 1408).
133. 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986).
134. 106 S. Ct. 875 (1986) (cert. granted, vacated, and remanded). U.S. Trust argued
that Dimension Financial could not resolve the issues of U.S. Trust because: (1) U.S.
Trust's subsidiary did not make commercial loans, even as defined by Regulation Y; (2)
Dimension Financial concerned activities more significant to nonbank banks owned by
firms, whereas U.S. Trust concerned activities significant to nonbank banks owned by bank
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Financial a unanimous Court 35 held that the Board had exceeded
its statutory authority by redefining "demand deposits" and "com-
mercial loans" as it had."3 6 The Court recognized that the BHCA
grants the Board broad regulatory power over bank holding com-
panies,13 7 but held that the BHCA's definition of a "bank" limits
the Board's regulatory authority.
3 8
The Court first examined the BHCA statutory language to
determine Congress' intent regarding the Board's power to change
the definition of a "bank."'' 3 9 The Court found that Congress lim-
ited the BHCA's scope to institutions that accepted deposits with
a "legal right to withdrawal on demand.' 40 The Court determined
that the Board's attempt to include deposits that, "as a matter of
practice," are payable on demand within BHCA coverage was not a
reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.14 1 Because
holding companies; (3) Dimension Financial did not address the applicability of the Doug-
las Amendment to the ownership of depository nonbank banks; and (4) Dimension Finan-
cial did not interpret the BHCA's full definition of "bank" as applied to a depository non-
bank bank making no commercial loans. U.S. Trust Petition for Certiorari at 20-21, U.S.
Trust Corp. v. Board of Governors, 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated,
and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986). U.S. Trust agreed, however, with
the Florida respondents that if U.S. Trust was not denied outright, it should be argued in
tandem with Dimension Financial. "The Court will be better able to resolve the broad,
underlying issues of U.S. Trust and the related, specific issue of Dimension if both cases are
considered together." U.S. Trust Reply and Supplemental Brief at 4, U.S. Trust Corp. v.
Board of Governors, 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded,
106 S. Ct. 875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986).
135. The vote was 8-0. Justice White did not take part in the decision. 106 S. Ct. at
682.
136. Id. at 689.
137. Id. at 684. The Board has the power "to restrain the undue concentration of com-
mercial banking resources and to prevent possible abuses related to the control of commer-
cial credit." Id. (quoting S. Rae. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 24, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. Naws 5519, 5541).
138. 106 S. Ct. at 684.
139. Id. at 686. "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984). Accord American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); Cen-
tral Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm., 545 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1982); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has held that the literal meaning of a statute should not be followed to a conclusion
"plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole." United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (quoting Ozawa v. United Statres, 260 U.S. 178,
194 (1922)). Accord Train v. Colorado Pub. Inerest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976);
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1966).
140. 106 S. Ct. at 686.
141. The Court stated: "[N]o amount of agency expertise-however sound may be the
result-can make the words 'legal right' mean a right to do something 'as a matter of prac-
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NOW account depositors do not retain a legal right to withdrawal
on demand, the Court held that NOW accounts cannot be demand
deposits regardless of actual practice.'
Turning to the commercial loan provision of the bank defini-
tion, the Court found that the Board's inclusion of "commercial
loan substitutes"'43 exceeded the common interpretation of com-
mercial loans in the financial services industry.' 44 Including these
loan substitutes, the Court noted, contradicted even the Board's
previous interpretations of commercial loans.' 45 On prior occasions
the Board had excluded money market transactions from the com-
mercial loan definition.' 46 The Court also rejected the argument
that the 1970 addition of the commercial loan test was a "technical
amendment" prompted by the concerns of only one institution. 47
The Court reasoned that the statute's plain language and legisla-
tive history point to the statute's general applicability.'4 8 In 1970
Boston Safe had conducted some money market activities that the
Board sought to classify as commercial loans. 49 The Court, how-
ever, found no support for the contention that the definition of
commercial loans was intended to mean anything other than its
normally accepted usage. 50
After holding the Board's definitions to be unreasonable inter-
pretations of the statute's plain language, the Court then consid-
tice.' " Id. Furthermore, the Court noted: "A legal right to withdraw on demand means just
that: a right to withdraw deposits without prior notice or limitation." Id. (emphasis in
original).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 686 & n.4. In implementing its order, the Board referred to commercial
paper as "an important substitute for commercial loans." 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 840 n.34. The
Court seized upon this substitution language to show that money market activities were not
commercial loans. "Substitutes are not the same thing as the items being substituted for."
Holland, Supreme Court Rescues Nonbank Banks, BANKING EXPANSION REP., Feb. 3, 1986,
at 7.
144. 106 S. Ct. at 686-88.
145. Id. at 687.
146. Id.; see D.H. Baldwin Co., 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 280 (1977) (participating in the
federal funds market and issuing certificate of deposits are not commercial loans).
147. 106 S. Ct. at 687-88; see supra notes 31-34, 119-28 and accompanying text.
148. 106 S. Ct. at 687-88.
149. Id. at 688. According to the Court, the Board advised Boston Safe in 1972 that it
was not a BHCA bank. "The Board understands that Boston Safe purchases 'money market
instruments,' such as certificates of deposit, commercial paper, and bank acceptances. In the
circumstances of this case, such transactions are not regarded as commercial loans for the
purposes of the Act." Id. (quoting letter to Lee J. Aubrey, Vice-President, Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, from Michael A. Greenspan, Assistant Secretary, Board of Governors, p. 2
(May 18, 1972)).
150. 106 S. Ct. at 688.
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ered the argument that the new definitions fell within the overall
purpose of the BHCA.151 The Board contended that the purpose
behind the BHCA was to regulate institutions functionally
equivalent to banks.152 The Court, however, found the purpose of
the statute evident in its plain language.153 The Court reasoned
that to ignore the plain language of the statute would amount to
ignoring the compromise embodied in the amendments and worked
out in Congress as Congress sought a definition that would best fit
its purpose.5 4 Although noting a possible need to regulate non-
bank banks, the Court determined that Congress intended to regu-
late only banks as Congress had defined them in the statute and
not institutions that were functionally equivalent.'5 5 The Court
noted the possibility of an imperfect statute, but stated that Con-
gress, rather than the courts or the Board, should address any stat-
utory shortcomings. 156
E. Legal Uncertainties
The Supreme Court's Dimension Financial decision leaves lit-
tle doubt that the BHCA permits the creation of nonbank banks.
The Board has failed in its efforts to include transactions and ac-
counts that are close substitutes for commercial loans and demand
deposits in their definitions. Nothing in the legislative history indi-
cates that the definition of a "bank" should be interpreted in any
way other than as literally stated in the statute. The statutory lan-
guage is the product of compromise between competing policy con-
cerns. When viewed from the Board's or a court's limited perspec-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 688-89. "The 'plain purpose' of legislation, however, is determined in the
first instance with reference to the plain language of the statute itself." Id. (citing Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). But see supra note 139.
154. The Court further noted:
Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of specific provisions ig-
nores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the dy-
namics of legislative action. Congress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out
some vague social or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply
on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the legislation may
reflect hard fought compromises. Invocation of the "plain purpose" of legislation at the
terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in the
end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.
106 S. Ct. at 689.
155. Id.
156. Id.; accord Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Office of Workers Comp. Prog., 461
U.S. 624, 635-36 (1983); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Office of Workers Comp. Prog., 449
U.S. 268, 279-80 (1980).
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tive, which may fail to consider the full array of policy objectives
sought to be attained by Congress, the line drawn by Congress may
seem arbitrary. Congress, however, is the appropriate body to
weigh the competing policies and reach a definition that best re-
solves these policies. Both the courts and the Board must respect
the legislative balancing of policies and any resulting compromise.
The Board improperly relied on its own notion of banking policy
and its desire to regulate these financial institutions, thereby in-
vading Congress' legislative sphere.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in U.S. Trust five days
after announcing its Dimension Financial decision; the Court va-
cated U.S. Trust and remanded the decision to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit for further consideration in light of Dimension Financial. The
Eleventh Circuit reversed its original decision and held that U.S.
Trust's application for a nonbank bank, which was approved by
the Board, could not be prohibited judicially.157 The Supreme
Court's holding in Dimension Financial left little room for any de-
cision other than a reversal of U.S. Trust. The error in U.S.Trust
was manifest. The Eleventh Circuit ignored one half of a two part
test, finding that the 1970 addition of the commercial loan test was
merely a "technical amendment." The Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the BHCA was diametrically opposed to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's. The crucial distinctions were the Supreme Court's state-
ments that the 1970 addition was not a technical amendment and
that only Congress, not the courts or the Board, could amend the
statute.
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Dimension Financial,
legal uncertainties still exist and require clarification before a wide
scale proliferation of nonbank banks can take place. First, the
Florida district court's injunction in Independent Bankers, pres-
ently prohibiting the Comptroller from issuing any final nonbank
bank approvals, 158 will delay nonbank bank proliferation. The
157. 760 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded sub nom.
U.S. Trast v. Board of Governors, 106 S. Ct. 875, rev'd, 800 F.2d 1534 (1986).
158. Independent Bankers Ass'n of Am. v. Conover, No. 84-1403 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15,
1985) (preliminary injunction). One commentator has noted that, despite the district court
injunction, a number of methods still exist for establishing nonbank banks. These methods
include: having an existing national or state bank refrain either from taking demand depos-
its or making commercial loans; petitioning a state banking authority to charter a State
bank as a nonbank bank; or converting a state bank to a national one and having the new
bank refrain either from taking demand deposits or making commercial loans. Natter,
Dimension Case Ruling Could Lead to More Nonbank Banks, AM. BANKER, April 11, 1986,
at 6.
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Comptroller has not actively sought an appeal in this case, but
likely will do so in light of Dimension Financial.159 A change in
personnel at the Comptroller's office and the FDIC also may
impede future nonbank bank proliferation.'" The new Comptroller
already has stated his opposition to regulation by loophole.1 61
Thus, even if the injunction is overturned, the new Comptroller
may scrutinize nonbank bank applications more closely than the
prior, prononbank bank Comptroller.
A second legal obstacle is new state legislation barring non-
bank banks. In light of the growth in nonbank banks, some states
have adopted statutes prohibiting the operation of any type of lim-
ited-service bank.162 Most states, however, have not enacted such
legislation, and the validity of this legislation has yet to be tested
in the courts.
An obvious question in light of Dimension Financial is what
effect this decision will have on the plans of bank holding compa-
nies and other firms now that such a major hurdle to nonbank
banking has been cleared. Some industry observers predict that
the number of nonbank bank applications will increase well be-
yond the number now on file with the Comptroller;0 3 others expect
159. The general counsel to the Comptroller stated that, because of the Court's ruling
in Dimension Financial, the appeal was being taken off "hold." There are still uncertainties
as to when an appeal will be filed. Wermeil & Langley, supra note 68, at 3, col. 4.
160. Robert L. Clarke replaced C. T. Conover as Comptroller of the Currency and L.
William Seidman replaced Bill Isaac at the FDIC.
161. See Naylor, Comptroller Nominee Robert Clarke Unveils His Views on Banking
Policy, AM. BANKER, Nov. 13, 1985, at 22.
However, Comptroller Clarke admitted that he would have no choice other than to ap-
prove nonbank-bank applications once the injunction is lifted. The Comptroller also stated
that he does not favor legislation aimed simply at the nonbank bank loophole. Ringer, Unit-
ing Industry to Attack Nonbank Loophole Heads Agenda of Independent Bankers' Incom-
ing President, AM. BANKER, March 11, 1986, at 30, 40.
162. States passing laws banning nonbank banks include North Carolina, Connecticut,
Colorado, Florida, Virginia, and New Jersey. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 146 (testimony
of Charles Hardwick, Vice-Chairman, National Conference of State Legislatures). One com-
mentator has questioned the applicability of state regional interstate banking laws to non-
bank banks, noting that the states' authority to pass these laws comes from the BHCA,
which allows states to regulate interstate bank acquisitions. Because nonbank banks techni-
cally are not "banks" within the meaning of the BHCA, it is argued that applying this
legislation to nonbank banks could constitute an "impermissible interference with interstate
commerce" and, as such, violate the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Natter, supra note 158, at 4, 6.
163. See Naylor, High Court Throws Out U.S. Trust Ruling, AM. BANKER, Jan. 28,
1986, at 1, 38 (statement of Charles F. Long, executive vice-president, Citicorp). Representa-
tive Jim Cooper, (D) Tennessee, a member of the House Banking Committee, stated: "The
Fed had its finger in the dike for a long time. Now that it's been told it can't, the flood of
non-bank banks is coming." Wermeil & Langley, supra note 68, at 3, col. 2.
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interested companies to proceed with caution because,"" as one in-
dustry executive stated, "[t]here are still a lot of clouds hanging
over us."' 5 Although some legal uncertainties await clarification in
the courts, the major threat to the continued escalation of nonbank
banks is congressional action.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
A. Policy Concerns
Because the Court's Dimension Financial ruling leaves little
room for the Board or the courts to halt the expansion of nonbank
banks, those opposing the establishment of these institutions must
turn to Congress for assistance. As Congress examines the issues
and concerns surrounding the nonbank bank controversy, it should
not respond instinctively to what has been inappropriately labeled
a "loophole." 166 Calling the nonbank bank development a loophole
simply misrepresents the legislative history. Nonbank banks did
not arise from an unforeseen omission in the definition of a
bank.16 7 In 1970 Congress specifically sought to exclude from the
BHCA's scope those institutions, such as Boston Safe, that did not
make commercial loans. The existence of Boston Safe demon-
strates that Congress was aware that similar institutions would
accept the invitation to avoid the BHCA and its accompanying
product and geographical restrictions.6 8 The current definition is
164. William E. Gibson, senior vice-president and chief economist at RepublicBank
Corp. in Dallas stated: "We still need to talk to the lawyers before deciding anything." Nay-
lor, supra note 163, at 38.
165. Id. at 1 (statement of Julius Loeser, attorney with First Interstate Bancorp).
166. Congress and the public in general abhor anything resembling a "loophole" and
sentiment will favor closing such unintended openings. With this knowledge, opponents
have been quick to label the development of nonbank banks as "regulation by loophole" and
its supporters "an army of loophole pushers." Hearings, supra note 3, at 121 (statement of
William E. Nodine on behalf of U.S. League of Savings Institutions).
George D. Gould, undersecretary for domestic finance at the Treasury Department,
commented that the name nonbank bank, "with its accessory 'loophole,' is designed to evoke
opposition. One wonders what would have been the future of discount brokers if some pub-
lic affairs genius for securities firms had tarred them effectively with the term 'nonbroker
broker."' Regulatory Reform Needed in Nonbank-Bank and Thrift Dilemmas, Ax
BANKER, March 18, 1986, at 21-22.
167. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text.
168. As the Supreme Court noted:
The statute by its terms . . . exempts from regulation all institutions that do not
engage in the business of making commercial loans. The choice of this general language
demonstrates that, although the legislation may have been prompted by the needs of
one institution, Congress intended to exempt the class of institutions not making com-
mercial loans.
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not a "loophole," but rather a deliberate attempt to exclude insti-
tutions that Congress believed did not pose the same dangers as
full-service commercial banks.169 The only unforseen development
was perhaps the number of institutions that would choose this
route. 17
0
Congress again has the opportunity to examine the situation
and determine which institutions to include under the scope of the
BHCA. Congress' examination should consider carefully the overall
state of the financial services industry and disregard the negative
implications of the "loophole" tag hung on nonbank banks. In de-
termining the future of nonbank banks, Congress should evaluate
the principal concerns of nonbank banks' opponents. Critics' rea-
sons for their opposition to the spread of nonbank banks are many
and varied, but their arguments usually fall into one of four cate-
gories. First, nonbank banks violate the spirit of the Douglas
Amendment by permitting de facto interstate banking without a
state's consent.17 1 Second, nonbank banks violate the separation
between banking and commerce. 7 2 Third, the ability to acquire
nonbank banks has decreased greatly any interest in acquiring fail-
ing thrifts.77 Last, the growth of nonbank banks results in ineffi-
ciencies and misallocations of capital and other resources. 174 This
section addresses the validity of these concerns and their impact
on congressional deliberations concerning the continued existence
of nonbank banks.
The emergence of nonbank banks has led commentators to
question whether the two broad policies governing bank regulation
in the past-prohibiting interstate banking and limiting bank ac-
tivities to those closely related to banking-remain viable goals.
The ability of nonbank banks to avoid interstate banking prohibi-
tions has prompted some of the harshest criticisms of nonbank
banks. Opponents charge that nonbank banks contravene a state's
right to decide policy regarding interstate banking and force inter-
Dimension Financial, 106 S. Ct. at 687 (emphasis original).
169. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
170. "No legislature can be expected to catalog all the anticipated effects of a statute
." Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1719 (1985).
171. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 14 (statement of Paul Volcker, Chairman, Federal
Reserve Board).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 198-99 (testimony of Edwin S. Gray, Chairman, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board).
174. See id. at 89-90 (testimony of James G. Cairns, Jr., President, American Bankers
Association).
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state banking upon states. 175 Opponents also charge that if inter-
state banking is desired, it should be accomplished through a legis-
lative plan rather than haphazardly through nonbank banks.
Although nonbank banks are a means of escaping the BHCA's
geographical restrictions, interstate banking is already effectively
in existence and is becoming increasingly more prevalent. Many
states have passed statutes permitting out-of-state bank holding
companies to enter either on a reciprocal or nonreciprocal basis.'
76
Even without explicit statutory permission, bank holding compa-
nies have broken interstate barriers and presently conduct a vari-
ety of activities across state lines through grandfathered banks,1
Edge Act banks,'178 loan production offices, 179 nonbank subsidiar-
ies,' 80  special purpose banks,'"' shared automatic teller
machines,' 82 credit cards, national advertisements, and toll-free
175. See id. at 147 (testimony of Charles Hardwick).
176. See supra note 45. Twenty-two states have adopted reciprocal or nonreciprocal
interstate banking laws. See Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Probability or Reality, EcON.
REv., Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, March 1985, at 6, 9.
177. Nine grandfathered U.S. bank holding companies control 139 banks and 1,137
branch offices in 21 states. Seven grandfathered international banking organizations control
138 interstate offices. Whitehead, supra note 176, at 7-8.
178. "Edge corporations have been established under section 25(a) of the Federal
Reserve Act to provide international banking services. There are no geographic restrictions
on Edge corporations. . . . There are approximately 150 interstate offices of Edge corpora-
tions, the great majority of which are owned by the largest banking organizations." Cohen,
Interstate Banking: Myth and Reality, 18 Loy. LA.L. REv. 965, 972 (1985).
179. Loan production offices are permitted on an interstate basis as long as these facil-
ities only originate, but not approve or make, loans. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7380 (1979). Estimates
indicate that approximately 375 interstate loan production offices now exist. Cohen, supra
note 178, at 972.
180. The most popular method of conducting interstate banking operations is the
maintenance of interstate offices by nonbank subsidiaries controlled by bank holding com-
panies, permitted under section 4(c)(8) as activities closely related to banking. There are
approximately 6,000 interstate finance company subsidiaries and 700 mortgage banks as well
as various other offices active in leasing, trust services, insurance, and industrial banks. Co-
hen, supra note 178, at 970-71.
181. State legislation may create special purpose banks, thereby enabling out-of-state
institutions to establish a bank thereby limited to certain operations. "For example, an out-
of-state bank holding company may set up a single office to engage in wholesale banking or
credit card operations. To date, South Dakota, Delaware, Virginia, Maryland, Nebraska, and
Nevada have adopted such special-purpose provisions." Whitehead, supra note 176, at 17.
182. There are eight national shared automatic teller systems and over two hundred
regional systems. See Status of ATM's under State Branching Laws: Hearings on S. 2898
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1984)
(statement of Roland E. Brandel, member, Consumer Bankers Ass'n). National ATM net-
works include: Plus (47 states), Cirrus (43 states), The Exchange (33 states), Express Cash
(27 states), Citishare (15 states), Nationet (10 states), Visa (9 states), and Master Teller (5
states). See No Shakeout Yet for ATM Systems, BANuNo ExPANSION RFP., Sept. 17, 1984,
at 2-3. See generally Note, The Future of Shared Automatic Teller Networks in the Wake
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
telephone numbers. Some bank holding companies effectively have
established nationwide banking systems using these devices.'8 3 The
argument that prohibiting nonbank banks preserves the prohibi-
tions on interstate banking ignores the fact that these prohibitions
are breaking down through a variety of other means. Eliminating
nonbank banks alone would do little to stop the haphazard deteri-
oration of interstate barriers to banking.
Another argument in support of preserving prohibitions on in-
terstate banking is that these prohibitions ensure a diverse and
competitive financial services industry."" Opponents see nonbank
banks as a destabilizing force in this highly competitive market.8 5
In fact, the reverse is true. Rather than a negative impact, non-
bank banks have a positive effect on the marketplace. Nonbank
banks allow a bank holding company to diversify across state lines
and, therefore, lessen the holding company's risk. Nonbank banks
reach new customers who possess loan needs different from a bank
holding company's ordinary customers. Nonbank banks spread
loans to different industries and to different segments of the econ-
omy, creating a diversity that otherwise would not exist in a bank
holding company's loan portfolio. Thus, the loan loss risk is less-
ened because a bank holding company "avoid[s] putting too many
of its loans 'in the same basket.' ""86 Furthermore, as a bank hold-
ing company attracts new customers, it diversifies its deposit base
as well.187 Yet another benefit to bank holding companies is the
addition of new customer relationships in states that may allow the
future establishment of "banks" in their state by out-of-state bank
holding companies. 88 The impact on the customer also is positive:
rather than destabilizing a competitive market, new entrants lead
to more choices, lower prices, and greater flexibility for
customers.18 9
The second major category of criticism stems from an histori-
of Marine Midland Bank: A Call for Federal Legislation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1621 (1985).
183. "Given all the avenues open to banks or holding companies for providing bank-
ing-type financial services across state lines, it is hard to deny that interstate banking is a
reality today." Whitehead, supra note 176, at 17.
184. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 111 (statement of Charles T. Doyle, President-
Elect, Independent Bankers Association of America).
185. See id. at 125 (statement of William E. Nodine, U.S. League of Savings
Institutions).
186. Moulton, Nonbank Banks: Catalyst for Interstate Banking, Bus. REv., Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Nov./Dec. 1985, at 3, 6.
187. Id. at 6-7.
188. Id. at 7.
189. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 174-75 (statement of C. T. Conover).
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cal conviction that banking and commerce should remain separate.
The original reason for this separation was the belief that the
banking business was a low risk, prudent enterprise; commerce, on
the other hand, encompassed inherently greater risk. Nonbank
banks allegedly violate this principle because nonbank holding
companies can acquire nonbank banks. If the separation between
banking and commerce is not maintained, critics argue, "[a]nyone,
from securities firms to fast food outlets, could go into the banking
business."' 190 Critics advance three primary reasons for the neces-
sity of the banking/commerce separation. The first reason relates
to the original purpose of the BHCA-the prevention of a concen-
tration of resources. 9" Second, unless banking and commerce re-
main separate, a concern exists that credit extension decisions will
not be made at arm's length.' 92 Last, bank safety and soundness
concerns arise if the separation between banking and commerce is
relaxed.'
In reality, the demarcation between banking and commerce
has become blurred in recent years194 and eliminating nonbank
banks will do little to restore the separation. A nonbank bank
proliferation is allegedly the first stage in a movement toward con-
centrating banking resources in the hands of a few firms. This con-
centration, however, is unlikely ever to materialize.19 Critics
190. Id. at 111 (statement of Charles T. Doyle).
191. Id. at 14 (statement of Paul Volcker).
192. Id. at 111 (statement of Charles T. Doyle).
193. Id. at 85 (statement of Paul Volcker).
194. "When you get to the lines that you want to draw, for instance, between the
activities of investment banking and commercial banking, between insurance and commer-
cial banking, between real estate development and commercial banking, then, I think, the
lines have gotten more blurred . . . ." Id. at 37 (statement of Paul Volcker).
195. Two commentators have written:
In thinking about the liberalization of branching and product line restrictions on com-
mercial banks, Americans should not ignore the banking history of other countries.
Many observers have relied on casual appraisals of those experiences to conclude that
the adoption of unrestricted interstate banking would lead us to duplicate the concen-
trated banking structures of other countries.
. . .[T]he facts that were uncovered suggest that fears of excessive concentration
resulting from nationwide branching are exaggerated. In several countries the apparent
high levels of concentration are illusory . . . . And in those countries where banking
really is concentrated, this appears to result from the existence of barriers to entry
which do not and would not exist in the United States.
Baer & Mote, The Effects of Nationwide Banking on Concentration: Evidence From
Abroad, EcoN. PERSP., The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Jan.fFeb. 1985, at 3. The arti-
cle concludes by contemplating a situation of complete geographic and product deregula-
tion, predicting that the "net effect should be a reduction in concentration at the national
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expressed this same fear about grandfathered banks, but history
shows no evidence of a concentration ever occurring. 196 Even with-
out nonbank banks, nonbank holding companies still can own
thrift companies without restrictions on diversification into other
lines of business.197 The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
Paul Volcker, even has analogized these institutions to nonbank
banks, labeling them "nonthrift thrifts."'198 Nonbank holding com-
panies also own both federal and state chartered trust companies
and some of the more than 1,200 industrial banks. 99 In addition,
nondepository companies own finance and mortgage loan compa-
nies.2 00 The breakdown between commerce and banking also is oc-
curring on the bank side, with bank holding companies operating
discount brokerage firms and engaging in many other permitted
nonbanking activities.20 1 Furthermore, the Glass-Stegall Act per-
mits state chartered nonmember banks to affiliate with securities
firms.20 2
level. This effect should be even more unambiguous and pronounced at the local market
level." Id. at 16.
A comparison between states with varying branching laws reveals negligible differences
in concentration levels. Interstate banking would not result in increased concentration in
local markets, but rather more competitive pricing due to a breakdown in barriers to entry.
Rhoades, Interstate Banking and Product Line Expansion: Implications From Available
Evidence, 18 Loy. LA.L. REv. 1115, 1121-22 (1985).
196. Approximately 34,000 insured depository institutions exist in the United States,
and the number of national banks increased by 500 between 1980 and 1985. Hearings, supra
note 3, at 187 (statement of C. T. Conover). The concentration of resources in the banking
industry is small compared to other businesses, with the top 10 banks' (in size) share of the
deposit base decreasing two percentage points since 1980. Id. at 188. The Board has the
power under the 1970 amendments to the BHCA to review grandfathered banks and require
divestiture "to prevent undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices." Id. at 221. In over 100 reviews the
Board had not been able to find this kind of worrisome abuse and, consequently, has yet to
order divestiture in any of its reviews. Id.
197. One commentator has stated:
If a holding company owns only one thrift (a unitary thrift holding company) and its
federally insured institution meets the qualified institution standards, the parent com-
pany and its non-insured affiliates may undertake a virtually unlimited array of activi-
ties. Examples of unitary thrift holding companies include Household International,
ITT, National Steel, and Sears . . . . Unlike commercial banks, which must receive
approval from the Federal Reserve on 4(c)(8) activities, unitary thrift holding compa-
nies require no approval process.
Johnson, The Thrift Charter: A Valuable Alternative for Commercial Banks?, EcoN. REv.,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Oct. 1985, at 26, 30.
198. Hearings, supra note 3, at 15.
199. See id. at 174 (statement of C. T. Conover).
200. See id.
201. See id. at 33-34 (statement of Paul Volcker).
202. Four major sections in the Glass-Stegall Act consider the relationship between
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Nonbank holding companies, however, do not require the
actual ownership of a nonbank bank or other close bank substitute
in order to provide depository accounts for customers. These com-
panies already can provide money market or cash management ac-
counts from which third party payments can be made and a non-
bank holding company may become a deposit broker and sell
deposits of banks or thrifts.2 03 Thus, despite the emergence of non-
bank banks, the separation between banking and commerce has
deteriorated and will deteriorate further because of competition
and innovation. The probability of an undue concentration of re-
sources resulting from a breakdown is remote, but could be ad-
dressed through regulation or legislation.0 4
Another concern supporting the separation of banking and
commerce arises from the belief that nonbank holding companies
will use their nonbank banks' credit to grant preferential treat-
ment to the holding company's customers or to its other subsidiar-
ies. Former Comptroller C. T. Conover argued that this threat is
minimal and can be addressed through regulatory safeguards. 0 5
The former Comptroller also favored prohibiting nonbank holding
companies' nonbank banks from making commercial loans. This
would prevent possible conflicts of interest and ease concerns over
the use of insider information.0 8 Other regulators also may place
restraints and conditions upon their approval of nonbank bank ap-
plications in order to limit the possibility of unfair competition. 0 7
According to some observers, an influx of nonbank holding
companies in the banking area is clearly a positive development
rather than a threat to the safety and soundness of the banking
system.0 8 Consumers and the financial system as a whole benefit
from the infusion of outside capital and talent.209 Any threat to
existing banks is minimal in light of the historical adaptability of
banking and securities firms. They are 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 78, 377, and 378 (1982). Only one,
§ 378, applies to state chartered nonmember banks. This section makes it unlawful for any
organization engaged in the securities business to engage in the business of receiving depos-
its at the same time. "However, nonmember banks only were required to choose between
engaging in deposit banking or investment banking, and were not affirmatively required to
separate themselves from their security affiliates." SYMONS & WHrrE, BANKING LAW, at 435
(2d ed. 1984).
203. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 99 (statement of James G. Cairns).
204. See id. at 175 (statement of C. T. Conover).
205. Id. at 175 (statement of C. T. Conover).
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 174-75.
209. Id. at 175.
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banks and their ability to react to changes in the industry. 10
Banks, however, have been hurt by their inability to respond to
nonbank competition with the present geographical and product
restrictions in place. 211 Nonbank banks allow bank holding compa-
nies to avoid geographic restrictions. Meanwhile, the Board volun-
tarily has increased the number of permitted nonbanking activi-
ties, thus easing the pressure resulting from product restrictions.
Critics still maintain that nonbank banks allow organizations
outside the banking sphere to skim off the most profitable pieces
of the banking business and, consequently, to erode the health and
competitive position of existing banks.21 2
The third major category of criticism originates primarily from
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB
charges that the availability of nonbank banks has led to a
decrease in the number of purchasers of failing thrifts. 13 When a
210. Pavel & Rosenblum, Banks and Nonbanks: The Horse Race Continues, ECON.
PERSP., Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May/June 1985, 15.
211. Two commentators have stated:
Bank activities have long been heavily regulated, not only because of concern over
potential conflicts of interest, unfair competition, and undue concentration of re-
sources, but more important, for safety and soundness reasons....
. . .Proponents of deregulation argue that continued regulation of activities adds
nothing to the system protecting bank safety and soundness. They further contend
that regulation places banks at a competitive disadvantage and will allow less-regulated
nonbank competitors to assume banks' role in our financial system. Advocates of con-
tinued regulation argue that deregulation would strain the rest of the safety and sound-
ness system and could even undermine the banking system....
'. .Our conclusion is that deregulation poses no threat to the stability of the
financial system but that failure to deregulate does pose such a threat.
Wall & Eisenbeis, Risk Considerations in Deregulating Bank Activities, EcoN. REV., Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, May 1984, 6.
212. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 84-85 (statement of Paul Volcker). Robert Clarke,
however, takes the opposite view:
Banking is trapped in a catch-22. It cannot adapt now because 50 years ago men who
wore spats and carried walking sticks believed commercial banking, if strictly regu-
lated, carried less risk than other types of financial services. As a result, restrictions on
allowable activities have prevented U.S. banks from effectively serving changing cus-
tomer needs, while other financial competitors have made significant inroads into some
of the best banking market segments....
• . . [T]hey also have made it difficult for banks to seek alternative sources of income
as their traditional activities have become less profitable. As a result, banks too often
have taken on more risky lending or concentrations of credits as they have sought to
maintain an acceptable level of profitability. The consequences of long-standing restric-
tions have become more severe in recent years as the competitive and economic condi-
tions have evolved. Bank performance, clearly, has suffered.
Clarke's Historical Perspective Argues for Greater Bank Powers, AM. BANKER, April 29,
1986, at 4.
213. See Hearings, supra note 3, at 198-99 (statement of Edwin J. Gray).
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bank holding company can move interstate by acquiring a nonbank
bank in good financial condition, the FHLBB argues, the holding
company will not acquire a failing thrift and its attendant
problems to accomplish the identical purpose. Extending this logic,
however, would require eliminating regional interstate banking
because this also decreases interest in acquiring failing thrifts.214
Furthermore, because failing thrifts are available for purchase,
eliminating nonbank banks would not protect the prohibitions on
interestate banking. Eliminating nonbank banks would only make
riskier a bank holding company's move interstate because bank
holding companies desiring to move interstate are prohibited from
acquiring nonbank banks in good financial condition. Therefore,
prohibiting nonbank banks merely would force those bank holding
companies that desire to move interstate to purchase less finan-
cially attractive thrifts, thus posing an inherently greater risk for
the holding company. One commentator has suggested that to as-
sist the FHLBB, rather than eliminating nonbank banks, a better
solution would be to merge the FHLBB's insurance fund with that
of the FDIC.215
The American Bankers Association ("Association") has
expressed the final major category of criticism, charging that non-
bank banks are inefficient and result in a misallocation of capital
and other resources. 216 Nonbank banks are inefficient, the Associa-
tion argues, because they are costly to establish and provide only
limited services.217 Capital is misallocated when used to create lim-
ited service facilities rather than "supporting a wider scale, more
efficient economic growth that is possible under a more traditional
bank."2 '8 The costs of inefficiencies and misallocation are suppos-
edly borne by the consumer. 19
The former Comptroller disagreed vehemently with this argu-
ment.220 Bank holding companies are capable of making invest-
214. Id. at 252 (statement of C. T. Conover).
215. "If the existence of market forces means that the franchise value of thrifts goes
down, I don't think the Government ought to step in to limit the number of institutions
because we want to supply some money to the FSLIC. If the FSLIC needs some more funds,
we ought to merge it with the FDIC." Id. at 241-42 (statement of William M. Isaac, Chair-
man, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
216. See id. at 89 (statement of James G. Cairns).
217. Id. at 90.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. "I think that's an incredible argument; I don't think it makes any sense at all."
Id. at 240 (statement of C. T. Conover).
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ment decisions based on projected returns. A nonbank bank would
not open unless a fair return was feasible. 221 The flow of capital
into limited service facilities will continue so long as geographic
restraints exist on full-service banks. Competitive pressures will
force this result. The number of loan production offices and special
purpose banks is increasing despite their ability to offer only lim-
ited services. A nonbank bank, however, which offers NOW ac-
counts and makes commercial loans, is more equivalent to "tradi-
tional banking" than these limited service facilities. Even with a
prohibition on nonbank banks, limited service institutions will in-
crease as long as bank holding companies are prohibited from com-
peting on a full scale basis with other financial institutions.
The various policy concerns surrounding the proliferation of
nonbank banks ultimately narrow to the question of whether the
historical concerns of separating banking and commerce and
prohibiting interstate banking remain valid. The primary criti-
cisms behind opposition to interstate banking and product deregu-
lation are that a concentration of banking services will result and
bank safety and soundness will be compromised.2 2
At present banking is relatively free of market concentration.
With regard to domestic deposits, the largest bank has a 3.7 per-
cent share of the national market and the ten largest banks to-
gether have only a 14.8 percent collective national market share. 23
These statistics, however, overstate the market concentration of
banking services because a variety of other financial and nonfinan-
cial companies are now performing traditional banking func-
tions.2 24 Of all the consumer installment and revolving credit lend-
ers in the United States, General Motors is the largest and seven of
the top ten are nonbank competitors. 25 General Motors has a 26
percent share of the automobile lending market; the largest bank
in the market, Bank America, has only a 1.3 percent share.226 Of
institutions issuing credit cards, Sears has 66.6 million cards out-
standing while the nearest bank, Citicorp, only has 11.7 million
221. Id. at 240-41.
222. See Cohen, supra note 178, at 965; Note, The Demise of the Bank/Nonbank Dis-
tinction: An Argument for Deregulating the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98
HARV. L. Rv. 650-56 (1985).
223. Cohen, supra note 178, at 974.
224. See id. at 974-76.
225. Lecture by Silas Keehn, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Owen
Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University (March 15, 1986) [hereinafter
Keehn Lecture].
226. Id.
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cards outstanding.2 The banking industry, therefore, appears free
from market concentration when nonbanking competitors are
taken into consideration.2 8 Congress first imposed the limitations
on interstate banking when nonbank competition did not exist.
Thus, the current presence of these nonbank competitors should
allay fears of market concentration.
The fear of market concentration in the banking industry
stems from the banking history of other countries.2 29 A study con-
ducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, however, found
that such fears were unfounded.28 0 In those countries with rela-
tively high levels of market concentration in the banking industry,
barriers to entry into the banking industry existed that do not ex-
ist in the United States.231 The study concluded that complete geo-
graphic and product deregulation would lead to a reduction in
market concentration at the national level, with an even more
unambiguous and pronounced effect at the local market level.23 2
The removal of barriers to interstate banking may prompt an
increase in the acquisition of small and medium sized banks by
larger money-center banks. The removal of regional interstate bar-
riers already has resulted in the consolidation of smaller banks
with larger regional banks. In 1984 there were only eight interstate
bank acquisition proposals, but after the Supreme Court's ruling in
Northeast Bancorp the number of proposals increased to fifty-two
in 1985. ' Although some bank acquisitions will take place if the
barriers to interstate banking are removed, opportunities will re-
main for smaller, more efficient banks to enter specific market
niches. In states like California, where state-wide branching is per-
mitted and the banking industry is dominated by institutions such
as Bank America and First Interstate, the number of new banks
entering the market has been increasing each year, 34 demonstrat-
ing the unlikelihood of increased market concentration.
227. Id.
228. Sears also has recently introduced its new Discovery credit card, which will com-
pete further with other national credit cards. "If banking organizations have been able to
retain 50% of the market for bank services, a percentage which appears high, then the larg-
est banking organization would have only a 1.85% national market share and the ten largest
only a collective 7.4% share." Cohen, supra note 178, at 975.
229. Baer & Mote, supra note 195, at 3.
230. Id.
231. Id.; see supra note 195.
232. Baer & Mote, supra note 195, at 16.
233. Keehn Lecture, supra note 225.
234. Id.
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Interstate banking is a positive force and is needed for the
continued strength of our financial system. To a large extent, inter-
state banking already exists. A recent study showed that up to 19
percent of consumers presently deal with an out-of-state financial
service provider.2 3 5 This same study also revealed that 41 percent
of the consumers that did not use an out-of-state provider would
feel comfortable using one with local offices.236 The consumer
would be one of the first to benefit from increased competition and
the more efficient pricing of banking services. 237 The variety and
quality of services will increase in this competitive atmosphere
while profits should fall.2 s The result will be a more efficient bank-
ing system.239
Just as the concerns over excessive market concentration lack
contemporary validity, the concerns over bank safety and sound-
ness arising from interstate banking and product deregulation also
are exaggerated. Just as nonbank banks will provide a positive ef-
fect on bank safety and soundness,240 an end to interstate banking
prohibitions also will further this goal. A greater number of ex-
isting institutions will diversify across state lines and thereby
lessen the risk associated with doing business in a specific state or
region. "The basic concept here is simple and universally accepted.
Diversification reduces risk. '2 41
Concerns over a breakdown in barriers between banking and
commerce focus on bank safety and soundness. Critics have argued
that in a bank holding company structure, the serious financial
problems of a nonbanking subsidiary might threaten the soundness
of a banking subsidiary 42 and that even if the banking subsidiary's
safety and soundness were not actually threatened, the public's
perception of the banking subsidiary's well being might be associ-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. "Although raising the specter of excessive concentration remains a potent tool in
political debate, recent studies suggest that neither excessive concentration nor anticompeti-
tive abuses are likely to ensue if activities regulation is eliminated." Note, supra note 221, at
656-57 (footnotes ommitted).
240. See infra text accompanying note 255.
241. Cohen, supra note 178, at 987. Because banks are limited geographically, a bank
is a captive of its state economy. A bank in a one industry state will have its loan portfolio
and profits tied to that industry. Examples of this today are the oil industry in Texas and
agriculture in states like Kansas and Iowa. Id.
242. Note, supra note 222, at 657.
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ated with the financial condition of the nonbanking affiliate. 43
That a banking subsidiary would be liable for the debts of its par-
ent bank holding company or its nonbanking affiliates, however, is
unlikely.24 4 Modification of current laws and regulations also could
address any fears that the subsidiary bank's resources would be
misappropriated by its parent or affiliates. 245 Finally, regulations
less intrusive than product regulation could be employed to curb
any problems associated with the public's perception of the stabil-
ity of the subsidiary.246
The regulations prohibiting interstate banking and separating
banking and commerce no longer address contemporary concerns.
Instead, the regulations tend to have a negative impact on bank
safety and soundness. If, however, Congress chooses to maintain
the prohibition on interstate banking and the separation between
banking and commerce, the elimination of nonbank banks will do
little to prevent the circumvention of these policies.
B. Legislative Proposals
Congress has moved slowly in addressing the nonbank bank
controversy as well as many other controversial topics in the finan-
cial services area. Both the House and Senate have held committee
hearings on the nonbank bank issue. 47 The House of Representa-
tives, however, has been unable to produce a bill addressing this
controversy. The Senate, on the other hand, passed "The Financial
Services Competitive Equity Act" in 1984 by an overwhelming
margin. 248 The Senate bill, however, expired at the end of the legis-
lative session because the House failed to pass comparable legisla-
tion. In 1985 the Senate failed to act on the issue other than to
hold committee hearings on nonbank banks and other issues of
concern in the financial services industry.2 49 The Senate Banking
243. Id. at 657-58.
244. Id. at 658.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 3; Moratorium Legislation and Financial Institu-
tions Deregulation: Hearings on S. 1532, S. 1609, and S. 1682 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Comprehensive Reform
in the Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous-
ing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I (1985) [hereinafter Comprehensive
Reform].
248. See Comprehensive Reform, supra note 247, at 1 (statement of Senator Jake
Garn). S. 2851 passed the Senate on Sept. 13, 1984 by an 89 to 5 margin. 30 CONG. REc.
S11162 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
249. See Comprehensive Reform, supra note 247.
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Committee preferred not to expend its time and resources passing
more legislation only to have it expire because of House inaction.
The Senate's concern was justified as the House again failed to
pass any legislation addressing the nonbank bank issue during
1985. The House, however, did hold hearings on the nonbank bank
issue and reported H.R. 20,250 "The Financial Institutions Equity
Act," out of the banking committee. The problem in 1985 arose in
the House Rules Committee, where debate over the bill prevented
it from being placed on the legislative calendar. In 1986 the House
Banking Committee again was unable to win the Rules Commit-
tee's approval because of a "mammoth lobbying effort led by
Sears, Roebuck & Co."'251 Similarly, the Senate failed to produce
any banking legislation during 1986, thus making the 99th Con-
gress the fourth consecutive congressional session to pass no signif-
icant banking legislative.25 2
With both chambers of Congress now controlled by the Demo-
cratic party, the likelihood of passing banking legislation in 1987 is
enhanced.253 Previously, the House and Senate had taken different
approaches to the nonbank bank issues. H.R. 20 "had a single fun-
damental purpose: to close loopholes in existing laws relating to
depository institutions. '254 Senator Garn, however, had pledged
that the "Senate will do more than just close loopholes." ' The
Senate leadership, however, has now changed. The new chairman
of the Senate Banking Committee, Senator Proxmire, is an outspo-
ken critic of nonbank banks and pushed for a one year moratorium
on nonbank banks at the end of the 99th Congress.25 Thus, the
chances of producing legislation banning nonbank banks, similar to
the House committee's proposed legislation, are now greatly
increased.
The House bill will accomplish what it proposes to
250. H. R. REP. No. 175, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985).
251. Naylor, Volcker Urges Congress to Give Top Priority to Nonbank Bank, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 20, 1986, at 1. Rep. Claude Pepper, Chairman of the House Rules Committee,
bottled up the bill because his home state of Florida "fear[ed] invasion by New York
banks." Naylor & Kutler, Comptroller Makes New Friends Even Among His Foes, AM.
BANKER, April 18, 1986, at 16-17.
252. See Naylor & Easton, Another Year with no Bills for Banking, AM. BANKER, Oct.
21, 1986, at 1.
253. See Naylor, Banks Face New Lineup in Democratic Senate, AM. BANKER, Nov. 6,
1986, at 1, 14.
254. H. R. REP. No. 175, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 10.
255. Comprehensive Reform, supra note 247, at 2.
256. See Naylor, Proxmire Stands His Ground on Nonbank-Bank Amendment, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 17, 1986, at 1.
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do-eliminate nonbank banks and nonthrift thrifts.25 This propo-
sal, however, is inappropriate and misguided for several reasons.
First, eliminating nonbank banks is a simplistic response to what
has been inappropriately labeled a loophole. The proposal does not
address the competitive, financial, and technological pressures that
gave rise to nonbank banks. Second, no evidence indicates that
nonbank banks hurt the consumer or the financial services indus-
try. In fact, the opposite is true. As discussed earlier, nonbank
banks allow bank holding companies and other firms to diversify
and, therefore, to reduce their risk exposure. Nonbank banks also
offer the consumer lower interest costs and greater convenience.
Finally, the proposal does not address any of the policy questions
arising from the nonbank bank controversy, such as whether the
interstate restrictions serve a useful purpose when interstate bank-
ing effectively exists, or whether nonbank banks owned by non-
bank holding companies fill a needed role in today's economy.
The challenge the House Banking Committee and Senator
Proxmire are attempting to avoid is the drafting of comprehensive
banking legislation. A bill such as H.R. 20 only will delay the need
to address the broader issues; it will not make them go away. The
problems in the banking industry only will intensify as competition
in the financial services industry increases and banks are placed at
a competitive disadvantage because of geographic and product lim-
itations. These issues cannot be resolved through piecemeal legisla-
tion. As Senator Garn stated, "[w]e could simply close loopholes,
but if we did, new loopholes would develop overnight."25 The
House proposal is an inadequate response to the crucial issue of
what form the financial services industry should take in the United
States to best meet the needs of the future. Current banking law is
outmoded and does not "take into account all of the technological,
economic, demographic, and competitive changes that have oc-
curred in the past several years. '2 59
257. "Beyond redefining what is a bank, and thereby stopping the 'non-bank' bank
situation, the Committee has also found it necessary to amend the National Housing Act
provisions relating to savings and loan holding companies. Absent these changes, new loop-
holes would be created by which conglomerate enterprises could use thrift institutions to
circumvent existing law." H. R. REP. No. 175, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 8. See supra note 197.
258. Comprehensive Reform, supra note 247, at 2. George D. Gould reached a similar
conclusion, stating that "the prohibition approach runs the sizable risk of failing to hold
back market change and thus misses an opportunity to develop the right regulation from
the start." Regulatory Reform Needed in Nonbank-Bank and Thrift Dilemmas, AM.
BANKER, March 18, 1986, at 21-22.
259. Collins, Congressional Update and Outlook on Interstate Banking, EcoN. REv.,
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Only comprehensive legislation can address these changes ade-
quately. 60 As demonstrated in this Note, removal of the barriers to
interstate banking and the restrictions on services provided by
banks or their affiliates will result in neither a concentration of
banking resources nor a compromise in the safety and soundness of
banks. Rather, these changes are needed in order to allow banks to
remain competitive in the rapidly changing financial services
industry. Failure to enact reformatory legislation, therefore, will
result in declining bank safety and soundness as banks are prohib-
ited from diversifying while their competition continues to expand
into traditional areas of banking. Nonbank banks are a way for
banks to react to the pressures found in a regulated environment.
If Congress were to address the issues of interstate banking and
the separation of banking and commerce by significantly relaxing
these regulations, nonbank banks would not be necessary. How-
ever, nonbank banks serve as the next best alternative until com-
prehensive banking reform legislation is enacted to ease the regula-
tory, competitive, and financial pressures in the financial services
industry.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, March 1985, 23, 27.
260. Even the new Comptroller, a critic of nonbank banks, states: "[Ilnstead of contin-
uing to argue over the nonbank bank, it would be preferable to move ahead at the federal
level with comprehensive legislation that grants banks in all states the ability to adapt,
directly and efficiently, to a changing market." Clarke's Historical Perspective Argues for
Greater Bank Powers, AM. BANKER, April 29, 1986, at 4, 12. Comptroller Clarke favors ex-
panding the number of permissible banking activities. Id.; see also Note, supra note 222, at
650 (discussing the implications of activities deregulation).
Similarly, many also are calling for full fledged interstate banking. President Reagan
asked Congress in his annual Economic Report of the President to dismantle interstate
banking barriers because "'it is time to move toward true interstate banking.'" Naylor,
Reagan Urges Action on Interstate Banking, AM. BANKER, Feb. 7, 1986, at 1. In a very
detailed study of the existing banking structure, the Administration's Task Force found the
existing system "perpetuates the existing discrimination against the retail customer, de-
prives the public of the benefits of increased competition, impedes the efficient allocation of
resources, retards the development and application of new technologies, and restricts the
ability of bank management to compete with other, nonbank financial institutions." Report
of the President, Dep't of the Treasury, Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in
the United States 2 (Jan. 1981). Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, also
favors interstate banking as a way to handle the number of ailing banks. Naylor, Volcker
Urges Congress to Give Top Priority to Nonbank Bank, AM. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1986, at 1.
Issues other than product and geographic restrictions also need to be addressed because of
the outdated nature of the nation's banking laws. See also Note, supra note 181, at 1621
(describing the necessity of federal legislation to ensure the development of electronic bank-
ing technology).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent Dimension Financial decision
has placed added pressure on Congress to address the nonbank
bank controversy. Congress no longer can delay action while wait-
ing for the courts to settle the issue. The financial services industry
is currently in disarray, with interstate banking existing despite
the BHCA's geographic restrictions. Companies outside the bank-
ing sphere have established services that compete directly with
banks, but operate without the geographic or product restrictions
that burden banks. In an effort to compete, bank holding compa-
nies have found various means to avoid the BHCA's product and
geographic restrictions. Nonbank banks have emerged from the de-
sire of both bank holding companies and various other multi-di-
mensional financial companies to compete with one another. Elimi-
nating nonbank banks will not ease this competitive pressure but
will serve only to restrict the ability of "banks" to compete with
those not subject to the BHCA. Comprehensive banking legislation
is needed to resolve the broader issue of bank regulation, and only
through legislative reform will the nonbank bank controversy be
resolved.
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